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Notes
Raising or Razing the e-Curtain?: The EU
Directive on the Protection of Personal Data
Kevin Bloss
On October 25, 1998, the EU passed Directive 95/46/EC
("Directive") establishing comprehensive standards for the pro-
tection of personal data throughout the 15-member European
community.1 The main goal of the Directive is to provide a
framework for EU countries to adopt comparable domestic laws
that will prevent the unauthorized dissemination of its citizens'
personal information amongst various companies both inside
and outside the EU.2
Data privacy for personal information in the EU has been a
growing concern since the early 1970's.3 Several of the member
nations have adopted domestic, privacy-protection statutes im-
posing wide-ranging affirmative obligations on both the coun-
try's public and private sectors. 4 The Directive is seen as an
effort to help harmonize domestic laws in order to promote a uni-
fied market within the EU and avoid disputes which could ulti-
mately lead to state-imposed data blockages between member
nations.5
The Directive will also greatly affect countries outside the
European Union. With the advent of the Internet, the ease of
conducting business and the ease of gathering information on a
world-wide level has pushed the requirements of this Directive
1. See W. Scott Blackmer et al., Online Consumer Data Privacy Regula-
tion in the U.S., ELEc. BANEING L. & COM. REP. Apr. 1999, at 1.
2. See Henry J. Perritt, Jr. & Margaret G. Stewart, False Alarm?, 51 FED.
Comm. J.L. 811 (1999).
3. See Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice and Privacy: International
Choice of Law and the Internet, 32 INT'L LAw. 991, 1001 (1998); see also FRED H.
CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 32 (1997). The German State of Hesse
enacted the first data protection statute in what is now the Europe Union in
1970. See id.
4. See Swire, supra note 3.
5. See id.
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to the international forefront. 6 Therefore, while the Directive is
an attempt to create uniformity within the European Union, its
strict provisions for the protection of personal data will also be
required of all foreign entities that wish to do business within
the Union. 7 This unilaterally-decided, extraterritorial effect has
been the impetus for the burgeoning debate between the Euro-
pean Union and the rest of the world.8 Today, many sectors of
the U.S. market, as well as other markets world-wide, are not in
compliance with the Directive.9 Although ample opportunity for
negotiation among all the concerned parties exists, if no compro-
mise is struck, many areas of the world market could conceiva-
bly be denied access to European customers. The resulting
interruption in data flow, while obviously hurtful to businesses
in non-compliant areas of the world, will also adversely affect
European countries by decreasing their total amount of com-
merce. 10 The market pressures and their potential effects on
countries exemplify that the debates over the Data Privacy Di-
rective must reach some sort of accord, be it through a compro-
mise or a dispute resolution. Without a resolution the stand-off
could result in an extreme hindrance to global trade leaving all
major trading countries in an unfavorable economic state.1'
This, consequently, could cripple the further development of
electronic-commerce technology.
This Note will show the potential likelihood that rumina-
tions over this Directive will ultimately put it under the scrutiny
of a WTO dispute settlement panel. Part I of the Note will lay
out the basic structure of the Directive, highlighting the articles
which have and will likely continue to spawn the most debate
between the EU and the United States. Part II will show that
the EU and U.S. are not so diametrically opposed in their ap-
proaches to privacy regulation, as one would first assume. How-
ever, this note will also highlight some key problems behind
resolving this potentially devastating conflict which makes it
6. See Swire, supra note 3, at 1008. It is very possible that the problem
the Internet creates in relation to this directive was not even considered when
the Directive was formed because its drafting occurred in the early nineties.
See id.
7. See, Gary E. Clayton, Manager's Journal: Eurocrats try to Stop Data at
the Border, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1998, at A34.
8. See Perritt & Stewart, supra note 2, at 812.
9. See Graham Pearce & Nicholas Platten, Orchestrating Transatlantic
Approaches to Personal Data Protection: A European Perspective, 22 FORDHA"
INTVL L.J. 2024, 2034 (1999).
10. See Perritt & Stewart, supra note 2, at 820.
11. See id.
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difficult to see any possibility of an accord between the EU and
the U.S. Part III of this Note will attempt to read the tea-leaves
by discussing both how this conflict could find itself in front of
the WTO, and some of the issues a WTO panel would consider if
asked to hear this case.
I. Basic Structure of the Directive
The Data Privacy Directive was an early 1990 response to a
growing number of domestic privacy laws that arose in Europe
throughout the 1970's and 1980's.12 The Directive, being merely
procedural, has little control in directing EU member-nations to
adopt domestic laws that conform to the Directive's provisions. 13
This important distinction shows that, even though the Direc-
tive is in force, many of the required domestic laws have yet to
be created, thus leaving room for potential negotiations among
interested parties.
The Directive's privacy requirements pertain to all process-
ing of personal data. "Processing" is defined as "any operation or
set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means." 14 "Personal data" is also
defined broadly as "any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person ('data subject')."' 5 Any time data is
processed, collectors must notify the data subject of their identi-
ties, and of the intended use for the information being gath-
ered.' 6 The data can then only be used with regard to the
purposes for which it was obtained. 17 Moreover, data subjects
have the right to opt out before a collector can give their infor-
mation to third parties for other marketing purposes.' 8 Data
subjects also have the right to access their personal data and
correct any errors that may be found.' 9 These requirements ap-
ply to all data collectors regardless of EU status.
12. See Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2024-2026.
13. See Swire, supra note 3, at 994 (explaining that the resultant legisla-
tion adopted by the various member-states must comply with the Directive and
will take precedence over any preexisting domestic laws with which it is in
conflict).
14. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 0. J. (L281) 31 (visited Feb. 20, 2000)
<http://europa.eu.intlcomm/dgl5/en/media/dataprotinter/conlO881.htm>.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20001 647
MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
Perhaps the most controversial part of the Directive is Arti-
cle 4, which deals with choice of law provisions for the member
states. 20 The directive allows EU countries to apply their na-
tional provisions against any entity violating privacy rules
within that country, regardless of the entity's nationality. 21 In
particular, Article 4(1)(c) of the Directive brings under its pur-
view any data collector who "makes use of equipment, auto-
mated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member
State, unless such equipment is used only for purposes of transit
through the territory of the Community."22 While much of the
Directive presents problems for non-EU companies wishing to
do business or locate part of their operations in the EU, this pro-
vision implies that any individual gaining access to EU consum-
ers via as little as a computer screen within the Union will be
held liable if they transfer any personal information out of the
EU.23 The ongoing debate as to the exact meaning of Article
4(1)(c) and the practical difficulties in enforcing it on every non-
compliant party that gains access to EU consumers on the In-
ternet continues to gain momentum.24
Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive deal with transfers to
third-party countries. 25 Article 25 allows transfers to third-
party countries upon approval that those countries have ade-
quate levels of data protection. 26 Article 26 covers a series of
exceptions ("Derogations") to Article 25 allowing for data trans-
fer between the EU and third-party countries despite their lack
of adequate data protection.27 These exceptions range from un-
ambiguous consent of the data subject to individual contractual
agreements on privacy. However, each member state has the
right to nullify these exemptions if they so choose when passing
this or other domestic laws. 28
20. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 0. J. (L281) 31 (visited Feb. 20,
2000) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/dataprotlinter/
con10881.htm>.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See Swire, supra note 3, at 1007. It is also important to remember the
breadth with which "personal data" is defined in Art. 2 of the Directive to fully
appreciate the scope of Art. 4. See supra note 14.
24. See id.
25. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 0. J. (L281) 31 (visited Feb. 20,
2000) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/dataprotlinter/
conl0881.htm>.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. "By way of derogation from Article 25 and save where other-
wise provided by domestic law governing particular cases, Member States shall
648 [Vol. 9:645
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To enforce these and other provisions, each member nation
must create at least one supervisory authority able to intervene
for individuals and bring violations to the attention of the proper
judicial authorities. 29 The Directive allows these authorities to
block, erase or destroy data, impose bans on processing, warn or
admonish the controller, or refer the matter to the national par-
liaments or other political institutions.30 In the end, non-com-
pliance could lead to destruction of important data, blockage of
access to the EU market, and ultimately legal proceedings
against entities which fail to meet Directive requirements; all of
which causing significant economic harm.3 '
Whether an entity meets the requirements mentioned above
is to be determined by the laws of the EU country where it does
business.32 To aid countries in their decision-making process,
the Directive has created two advisory bodies: 1) one that can
provide advice on all matters of the Directive ("The Working
Party");33 and 2) another that can choose to implement this ad-
vice through a weighted vote of its members ("The Commit-
tee"). 34 For example, if an EU member-nation has ruled, with
the advice of The Working Party, that the United States or a
sector of the United States has inadequate privacy measures,
that decision could then be appealed to the Committee estab-
lished under Article 31 for a judgment on adequacy.3 5 The Com-
mittee then votes and releases a binding ruling.36
provide that a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country
which does not ensure an adequate level of protection within the meaning of
Article 25...." Id. (emphasis added).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 0. J. (L281) 31 (visited Feb. 20,
2000) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/dataprot/inter/
conl0881.htm>. But see Swire, supra note 3, at 999. "Supervisory authorities
have usually worked informally with controllers when complaints are ified. In
many instances, the controller explains why the practice in fact complies with
applicable standards or else agrees to modify the objectionable practice. This
non-litigation approach is likely to predominate under the Directive as well."
Id.
32. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 0. J. (L281) 31 (visited Feb. 20,
2000) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/dataprot/inter/
conl0881.htm>.
33. See id.
34. See id. at art. 31. The voting procedure is set up so that the larger EU
member-nations have a greater vote. See id. The decisions of this body are
then binding on all interested parties. See id.
35. See Swire, supra note 3, at 1005.
36. See id.
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At first blush, it appears that these advisory bodies can
usurp the authority of EU member nations; however, the pur-
pose of their creation was to help encourage a harmonization of
privacy laws among the member states.37 ,Theoretically, if all
member-nations adopt the appropriate privacy laws pursuant to
the Directive, the rulings of the advisory bodies created within
the Directive should never conflict with the domestic law of the
member-states. With this in mind, it appears that the creators
of the Directive intended these bodies to be merely supplemental
in nature and not in any way controlling over the member na-
tions to the extent of superceding domestic laws.
II-A. Problems that may arise under the EU Directive
One of the strongest and most persistent objectors to the EU
Directive is the United States. The United States and its com-
panies refuse to acknowledge personal data privacy as a funda-
mental human right.38 However, it is important to note the U.S.
is not completely insensitive to data privacy. In fact, there are
several federal statutes in various sectors of consumer and cor-
porate practices which address data privacy.39 Unfortunately,
these statutes are far from comprehensive and do not allow the
United States to claim that it meets the Directive's data privacy
requirements as a nation.40
The differing points of view about privacy rights between
the U.S. and the EU have led to key differences in the two enti-
ties' approaches to privacy that will make reconciliation of con-
flicts regarding the Directive difficult. First of all, the U.S.
approach to privacy, while recognizing its growing importance in
the eyes of the U.S. consumer,41 also realizes certain undeniable
37. See id. at 1004.
38. See Pearce and Platten, supra note 9, at 2047. "There appears to be a
reluctance on the part of the U.S. companies to acknowledge that privacy is a
fundamental human right that needs to reconciled with legitimate business in-
terests." Id.
39. See Blackmer et al., supra note 1, at 1. These statutes include FCRA
(Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681), COPPA (Children's Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act 1998, §§ 1302(1), 1303(b)(1)), and others which protect the
privacy of certain types of information such as the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2510), and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991 (47 U.S.C. § 227). See id. at 6-7.
40. See Perritt & Stewart, supra note 2, at 812.
41. See Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2025. "In the United States,
several recent consumer surveys have highlighted both a high degree of pubic
concern about privacy and skepticism about the effectiveness of existing U.S.
data protection practices." Id. (citing Louis Harris & Alan Weinstein, Corn-
650 [Vol. 9:645
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economic advantages to be gained from collection and use of per-
sonal information. 42 With this relationship in mind, the U.S.
has developed a laissez-faire approach to most privacy regula-
tions, allowing the various sectors to work privately with con-
sumers to create an adequate system of protection.43 Unlike the
EU system, which focuses on the rights of consumers over the
importance of economic streamlining, the U.S. system attempts
to ensure that both interests are legitimately represented as
regulations are created. 44
As a consequence of this laissez-faire approach, and the rise
in consumer concern over privacy, a spate of self-regulatory bod-
ies have arisen around the U.S., primarily in relation to corpo-
rate Internet activities. 45 These bodies, such as TRUSTe,46
BBBOnline47 and other industry-led groups set up privacy regu-
lations for member corporations and then monitor those corpora-
tions to ensure that the regulations are being followed. 48 By
creating standards which all of the members agree to obey, these
self-regulating bodies also expose their members to possible en-
forcement by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for failure to
meet their self-prescribed rules.49 The FTC, while having little
power to enforce independent privacy rules, reserves the power
to enforce any company's self-prescribed privacy regulations if it
feels that the company is deviating from their privacy
promises. 50
merce Communications and Privacy Online: A National Survey of U.S. Com-
puter use, Privacy laws and American Business (1997)).
42. See Jonathon P. Cody, Protecting Privacy Over the Internet: Has the
Time Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U.L. REv. 1183, 1187 (1999).
The creation of "[tiailored advertising [(via collection of personal data)] can be
vital to the growth of electronic commerce because, as marketing costs fall,
more companies will begin to conduct more commerce over the Internet, which
in turn will lead to lower overall prices for consumers around the world." Id.
43. See id. at 1203.
44. See id.
45. See Blackmer et al., supra note 1, at 1.
46. See Cody, supra note 42, at 1220. "TRUSTe is a non-profit initiative
sponsored by companies such as Microsoft, IBM, AT&T, Excite and Compaq,
that provides oversight functions to ensure that its members are following their
posted privacy policies." Id. at 1220-21.
47. See id. at 1222. BBBOnline is a similar entity to TRUSTe initiated by
the Better Business Bureau that awards seals of approval to companies that
meet specified privacy requirements. See id.
48. See Blackmer et al., supra note 1, at 1.
49. See id. at 5.
50. See id. at 3-4. Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 47
U.S.C. § 45, the FTC has the right to investigate and enjoin any unfair or decep-
tive conduct in nearly any industry which affects interstate commerce. The
2000]
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One example of this enforcement is the Geocities case. 51 In
this case, the FTC accused the Geocities website of engaging in
illicit practices with its collection and use of personal informa-
tion from its online customers.52 Geocities denied the allega-
tions, but ultimately conformed its operations to the FTC
standards being demanded in the proceedings.5 3
These self-regulatory bodies are not without problems, how-
ever. If the FTC fails to act, individuals are left with no legal
recourse against the violating companies. 54 If the FTC does act,
however, there can still be problematic results in terms of creat-
ing privacy regulations. While certain companies will look to
the Geocities case as a benchmark for setting up privacy sys-
tems,55 others will see this as an excellent reason to avoid pri-
vacy policies all together.56 Also, it is important to note that the
self-regulating bodies could be reluctant to report any of the
member companies to the FTC (especially the prominent ones)
at the risk of losing their corporate sponsorship.5 7
Another problem that highlights the inability of the U.S.
and the EU to see eye-to-eye on the Directive is the hierarchy of
their legal systems. In the U.S., the courts are, for the most
part, the supreme arbiters and interpreters or the law. Ameri-
cans often look to the courts for answers to the scope and appli-
cation of statutes and common laws. When powers are
delegated to administrative bodies, there must be an absolute
delegation of power before a court will observe the administra-
tive advice. Even then, courts can approach administrative ad-
vice with skepticism. In the EU there is a much greater trust
and dependence on administrative bodies; their decisions tend to
carry more weight and they have better working relations with
European courts of law.58
right to investigate a company's self-prescribed data privacy standards is com-
mensurate with the acts this statute grants. See id.
51. See id.; see also Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of GeoCities:
Complaint (visited Oct. 17, 1999) <httpJ/www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/geo -
cmpl.htm>.
52. See Cody, supra note 42, at 1226.
53. See Blackmer et al., supra note 1, at 4 - 5.
54. See Cody, supra note 42, at 1225.
55. See Blackmer et al., supra note 1, at 5.
56. See Cody, supra note 42, at 1226. Avoiding self-prescribed privacy
rules also avoids any FTC involvement with your company on privacy grounds.
See supra note 42, and accompanying text.
57. See id. at 1227.
58. See Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2025.
652 [Vol. 9:645
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Both the recognition of the importance of markets and the
comparative distaste for giving administrative bodies too much
power, make it difficult to predict any easy solution to the di-
lemma that the Directive presents. From a practical standpoint
both entities will try to persuade the other towards compromise.
From a strategic standpoint, the EU could accept some of the
U.S. sector-based privacy regulations as "safe-harbors," thus
giving certain companies within an industry a competitive ad-
vantage over other companies without adequate data privacy
protection. 59 Theoretically, this will create an incentive for the
non-compliant companies to create proper regulations.60 How-
ever, many U.S. companies may attempt to circumvent the Di-
rective by creating individual contracts with various parts of the
EU market agreeing to the required data protections.6' There
also remains the chance that the EU plans back-fire and various
parts of the world purposely avoid complying with the standards
in an effort to make a political statement about the privacy
requirements. 62
II B. Possibilities for Resolution
Even though the EU and U.S. seem light years apart in
resolving this issue, there is room for compromise. The national
regulations and regulatory bodies that will be formed by the EU
pursuant to this Directive are still in developmental stages.63 It
is quite possible that EU countries could work with foreign cor-
porations within its borders when developing their domestic
laws.64 The EU has shown before that it is willing to move on
these issues.65 This is evidenced by the constant reductions in
rigidity of the Directive throughout its development over the last
decade.66 The EU must also take into account the fact that the
U.S. is the leading power in the Internet industry. To coldly re-
59. See id. at 2049.
60. See id. at 2049.
61. See id. at 2048.
62. See Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2034.
63. See supra Part I.
64. See Swire, supra note 3, at 1020. "[A]nalysis suggests that national
data protection rules might work reasonably effectively where the data is pri-
marily in the hands of the largest companies." Id.
65. See Matthew J. Feeley, The Rise of Self-Regulation, 22 B.C. Irr'L &
Comp. L. REv. 159, 171 (1999). This article posits that the EU made a shift
closer to the idea of self-regulation shortly after a speech by President Clinton
which advocated self-regulation as the proper approach to data privacy issues.
See id.
66. See id.
2000] 653
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ject any offers at long-term compromises could lead to an inabil-
ity of EU companies to take advantage of Internet-related
economic opportunities in the U.S. .67
The U.S. also has room to improve by increasing the respon-
sibility of the FTC. As stated, the FTC already engages in a
form of overview on privacy protection regulations, so it is possi-
ble that these responsibilities can be increased in the hopes of a
compromise. One method that immediately presents itself is to
set up a system whereby corporations by default, adopt a set of
FTC-ordained obligations on privacy protection. The corpora-
tions would not be forced to adopt the measures, they would sim-
ply have to clarify their intentions to adopt alternative measures
and not participate in the FTC system. It is likely that inertia
and public perceptions would play a large role in this system.
Companies may be reluctant to publicly reject the basic privacy
principles of the FTC, or simply may be unwilling to go to the
trouble of creating their own guidelines.
Another idea would be to include discussions on this issue in
the next GATTIWTO negotiation rounds. 68 However, this
presents problems because the trade negotiators may not be ex-
perienced in the methods of privacy law and the issue could
prove to be such a sticking point that it might significantly hin-
der the negotiations altogether.
III. The Directive and the WTO
On a larger scale, the U.S. could also attack the Directive as
a barrier to trade and a violation of the WTO Agreement.69 Ad-
visers to President Clinton have stated that if the EU and the
U.S. cannot work out their differences concerning the Directive,
the U.S. will challenge the legitimacy of the Directive's extrater-
ritorial control by going to the WTO. 70 The resultant decision by
the WTO is difficult to predict because such a decision relies
heavily upon the facts of the particular case through which the
U.S. would challenge the Directive. 71 Nonetheless, when look-
ing at various prohibitions under the GATT and some past deci-
67. See id. at 171-72.
68. See Swire & Litan, supra note 3, at 189.
69. See Perritt & Stewart, supra note 2, at 820-21. These regulations "are
tantamount to discrimination against trade in goods or services with foreign
countries." Id.
70. See Swire and Litan, supra note 3, at 189. Ira Magaziner adviser to
President Clinton stated the intentions of the U.S. to involve the WTO in this
dispute at a conference at the Brookings Institute on February 6, 1998. See id.
71. See id. at 192.
[Vol. 9:645654
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sions made by various GATT/WTO panels, one can extrapolate
certain situations where the EU Directive could conflict with the
EU's previously-agreed-to GATT obligations.
One area where the EU Directive appears to directly conflict
is the Most Favored Nation obligation (hereinafter "MFN")
agreed to in the GATT. 72 The MFN clause states that all con-
tracting parties to the GATT/WTO must afford identical privi-
leges to every other contracting party with respect to any given
product either imported into or exported out of its country.7 3
For example, imagine a product that requires customer in-
formation for its sales and distribution around the world. As-
sume that this information is gathered on a large-scale basis
thereby negating any possibility for personal consent to the com-
pany's data collection. 74 One such industry that fits this de-
scription and has already suffered national enforcement of the
Directive is the U.S. airline industry.75 The particular airline in
this situation was forced by Swedish privacy authorities to cre-
ate a bifurcated database: one database for EU citizens with ad-
equate privacy protections and one database for the rest of the
world.76 While Sweden's prohibitions may have left the U.S. air-
line industry with little recourse but to alter their database, the
U.S., as a contracting party to the GATT, could challenge the
measure as a violation of GATT provisions.77
72. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
ll, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [herinafter GATT].
73. See id. The MFN clause states in relevant part,
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation
and exportation, . . . any advantage favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or des-
tined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and uncon-
ditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties.
Id.
74. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 10, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 (visited
Feb. 24, 2000) http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/dataprot/inter/con
10881.htm; see also supra Part I.
75. See Review & Outlook, Editorial, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1999, at A26.
"American Airlines was forced to stop transmitting information - such as meal
preferences or requests for wheelchair assistance - about European passengers
to the company's Sabre reservation system in the U.S. after Sweden's national
privacy watchdog forced the airline to set up a separate database." Id.
76. See id.
77. See GATT art. XXIII(2). Article XXIII(2) states,
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or im-
paired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is be-
ing impeded as the result of (a) the failure of another contracting party
to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application
2000] 655
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The strength of the U.S. claim would be greater if the U.S.
could establish to the WTO that airlines in other countries were
not subject to the same prohibitions as the U.S. airline industry.
If the U.S. showed that other WTO members have airlines with
open access to the personal information of European citizens, it
would have a strong argument that its airline ticket industry is
entitled full access to the EU air-passenger market.78 Using
GATT terminology, the U.S. could maintain that the EU Direc-
tive is a rule or formality which creates a privilege or immunity
for the export of airline tickets from contracting parties that
meet the Directive requirements. Such privilege and immunity
should be accorded immediately and unconditionally to other
contracting parties with regard to airline tickets according to
GATT Article I.7 9
The airline industry is just one of many possible examples
through which the U.S. could challenge the Directive's validity
under the GATT. Any product subject to different treatment by
the EU, based on the Directive's prohibitions, will leave the EU
with little to argue before a WTO panel. Past MFN decisions
have held that the burden of proving discriminatory treatment
lies with the parties claiming discrimination.80 Although many
MFN cases only deal with disputes over tariff application to
products, the broad scope of the language in the MFN clause
seems to imply that methods of decision-making adopted by
these WTO panels would easily apply to other factors affecting
trade, such as rules or regulations.8 ' If the U.S. could establish
its complaint by meeting the burden set out by earlier panels,
the U.S. would legitimize its challenge of the Directive under the
MFN clause.
When rendering MFN clause decisions, WTO panels always
consider whether the product subject to the alleged discrimina-
by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it con-
flicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any
other situation,... the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES [(i.e. WTO panel)]. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make
appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties.
78. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
79. See id.
80. 79 See Japan - Tariff on Import of Spruce-Pine-Fir (SPF) Dimension
Lumber, July 19, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. 167 (1990). "A contracting party which
claims to be prejudiced [(under MFN obligations)].., bears the burden of estab-
lishing that such tariff arrangement has been diverted from its normal purpose
so as to become a means of discrimination." Id.
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text for scope of MFN clause's
application.
[Vol. 9:645
20001 PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA
tion is a "like product" to the product benefiting from the regula-
tion or tariff in question.8 2  This is often a difficult
determination to make. To do so, panels usually consider such
things as methods of production and a product's particular
uses. 83 Panels dealing with MFN claims have also created an
interesting juxtaposition by acknowledging the importance of
letting the importing country make its own classifications for
product tariffs, and also acknowledging the importance of uni-
formity among national classifying systems.84
When arguing before a WTO panel, the EU could rely upon
the mixed signals on how products are properly classified as a
defense. The EU could argue that, according to their classifica-
tion system, products imported into the Union without adequate
privacy safeguards are different than products imported with
adequate privacy safeguards. However, when one considers that
the products being compared will likely be nearly identical and
used for the same purpose, the EU's separate classification
would likely be discriminatory treatment.
If the panel does not find a GATT violation from an MFN
argument, the U.S. could also argue that the Directive has nulli-
fied or impaired anticipated benefits under the GATT.8 5 In or-
82. See Spain - Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, June 11, 1981,
GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 102 (1982). Spain attempted to apply different
tariffs to various types of coffee beans based on differences in the imported cof-
fee due to geographical factors and cultivation methods for the various beans.
The panel hearing the case rejected these factors as legitimate methods of dif-
ferentiation and found that since the beans were often used in tandem to make
various coffee blends they should not be subject to differing tariffs. See id.; see
also Treatment By Germany of Imports of Sardines, Oct. 31, 1952, GATT
B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 53 (1953). Although not ultimately considered by the
panel when it reached its decision, like product analysis was argued by both
parties to the dispute and the panel acknowledged its importance in MFN anal-
ysis. See id.
83. See Spain - Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, supra note 81. The
Spanish Coffee decision considered the different types of coffee beans to be simi-
lar under tariff schedules partially because the beans were manufactured to-
gether into coffee blends and also because the end use of all the beans was coffee
consumption. See id.
84. See Japan - Tariff on Import of Spruce-Pine-Fir (SPF) Dimension
Lumber, supra note 79. "[Ilf a claim of likeness was raised by a contracting
party in relation to the tariff treatment of its goods on importation by some
other contracting party, such a claim should be based on the classification of the
latter, i.e. the importing country's tariff." Id. (emphasis added).
85. See Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, supra note 81. The
panel focused on Norway's loss of anticipated benefits under the GATT when it
found Germany to be in violation of the agreement. See id..
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der to establish a nullification or impairment86 of anticipated
benefits the U.S. would have to establish that the Directive's en-
forcement has changed the competitive conditions for the spe-
cific product in the EU.8 7 They must also show that such a
change could not reasonably have been anticipated by the U.S.
Government when it entered into trade negotiations.
Theoretically, any impairments that the U.S. could claim
were caused by the Directive (either under MFN or under Nulli-
fication or Impairment) do not even have to be part of a previ-
ously agreed to multilateral tariff reduction schedule.88 The
MFN clause states only that all contracting parties have a right
to equal treatment on like products being imported into or ex-
ported out of another contracting party's territory.89 Also,
claims of nullification or impairment under the GATT can be
made by simply stating that "the attainment of [an] objective of
the Agreement is being impeded as the result of ... the applica-
tion by another contracting party of any measure whether or not
it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement." In either cir-
cumstance, the U.S. could say that the Directive is a serious det-
riment to the GATT's principle objective of trade
liberalization.90
86. See GATT art. XXIII (1). The nullification and impairment clause
states in relevant part,
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or im-
paired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is be-
ing impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out is obliga-
tions under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agree-
ment, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory
adjustment of the matter, make written representations or
proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it
considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus ap-
proached shall give sympathetic consideration to the rep-
resentations or proposals made of it.
Id.
87. See Treatment By Germany of Imports of Sardines, supra note 81; see
also The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Apr. 3, 1950, GATT/CP/
4/39 188 (1950).
88. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
89. See id.
90. See GATT preamble. The preamble states that in order to, among
other things, develop and expand the production and exchange of goods world-
wide, the participating governments are "desirous of contributing to these
objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
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In addition, the U.S. may have a valid claim under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services 9' (GATS). 92 Similar to the
GATT, the GATS also contains an MFN clause. An impairment
argument under the GATS more closely fits with the nature of
the Directive because data collection is itself not a product, but a
service. Also, collection of personal data is more often used by
businesses providing services, such as a contracting service, that
would need to know personal information from future employers
to effectively bid on certain jobs.9 3 The principle problem with
claiming damage under the GATS is that it contains an excep-
tion for the enforcement of personal privacy rules.9 4 However,
this exception is limited, by the requirement that the privacy
measures are not applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory
method.9 5 The EU would likely still rely heavily on this excep-
tion if involved in a GATS claim, and the U.S. would carry an
additional burden of proving that the exception does not apply to
this MFN dispute. That additional burden would not exist if the
U.S. could bring a claim under the GATT.
Even if the U.S. receives a favorable decision from the WTO,
this will not remove the Directive from the EU legal world. In
fact, the EU remains very adamant about maintaining its pri-
vacy standards.96 What the U.S. will gain out of a favorable
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce." Id.
91. See Swire & Litan, supra note 3, at 190.
92. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [herinafter WTO Agree-
ment], Annex lB. LEGAL INSTRUSMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [herinafier GATS].
93. See Swire & Litan, supra note 3, at 190. Swire and Litan posit that if
two different third countries had companies competing for the same contract
and the EU chose to prohibit one of the companies based on the Privacy Direc-
tive, the country in which the rejected company is located could claim under the
MFN principle of the GATS, especially if that country's privacy regulations
were not that different than the accepted country. See id.
94. See GATS art. XIV, This article states in relevant part,
nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption
or enforcement by any Member of measures... (c) necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Agreement including those relating to: ... (ii) the
protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing
and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidential-
ity or individual records and accounts.
Id.
95. See Swire & Litan, supra note 3, at 191.
96. See Review & Outlook, supra note 75. John Mogg, representing the EU
position on the Directive at a conference for American and Italian business ex-
ecutives, stated, "One of the myths to be dispelled is that you can develop the
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finding from the WTO is principally two-fold. First, a favorable
finding will allow the U.S. to legitimately begin suspending its
concessions to the EU in the amount equivalent to its estimated
losses from trade prohibitions caused by the Directive's enforce-
ment.97 Second, as the U.S. and the EU attempt to negotiate
some sort of an accord on the personal privacy issue, the EU will
be less reticent to seriously consider the self-regulatory system
under which the U.S. runs its personal data privacy
regulations. 98
There is also value in demonstrating to the rest of the world
that you are the correct party. The U.S. is the world leader in
information technology and has considerable control over deter-
mining the privacy protocols to be used in much of the software
distributed around the world.99 With the WTO ruling in its
favor the U.S. could more easily encourage the rest of the world
to take its side and avoid adopting privacy rules which have al-
ready run afoul of the GATT. The EU, in response, could argue,
as discussed above, that there exists a growing trend towards
data protection in the WTO with the advent of the GATS and
urge further improvement to guarantee even more data protec-
tion throughout the WTO community.' 00
IV. Conclusion
As e-commerce grows, without harmonization between the
U.S. and the EU on the Data Privacy Directive, one of the two
economic super-powers of the world could be left isolated in
many facets of the global economy.'l 0 To achieve compromise,
both sides will need to recognize the structure of the other's sys-
tem. The EU must recognize the importance that the U.S.
places on letting the market play a role in regulation, 0 2 and the
full potential of the net without rules." Id. He further noted, "The Wild West
Web is not an option." Id.
97. See GATT art. XXIII. Article XXIII states,
[ilf no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting par-
ties concerned within a reasonable time... [and] the CONTRACTING
PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify
such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to sus-
pend concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.
Id.
98. See Blackmer et. al. supra note 1, at 4 -5.
99. See Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2050.
100. See Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2051.
101. See Pearce & Platten, supra note 9, at 2034.
102. See Swire, supra note 64, and accompanying text.
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U.S. must acknowledge that the creation of an administrative
body to oversee the enforcement of privacy regulations may be a
necessary evil to monitor a system of such magnitude.

